Which one in the following is not among the four sources of law as mentioned by Kautilya ?

Question

Accepted Answer

The correct option is 4:

Kautilya, in his monumental treatise on statecraft, the *Arthashastra*, lays down a comprehensive framework for royal governance and jurisprudence. He systematically identifies four sources from which the King's courts (Dharmasthiyas) must derive law and judgment. These four sources, collectively known as the *Chaturvyuha*, are **Dharma** (Sacred Law/Moral Code), **Vyavhar** (Custom or Evidence/Transaction), **Charitra** (History, Regional Custom, or Conduct of the Elders), and **Rajasasana** (Royal Edicts or Orders). Since **Pratyukta** is not listed among these four fundamental sources by Kautilya, it is the correct answer to the question asking for the one that is *not* a source of law according to him. The four sources form a hierarchy, where royal edicts (Rajasasana) are generally considered superior and binding in case of conflict with the other three, reflecting the centralized authority of the Mauryan state.

The incorrect option is 1:
Dharma (Sacred Law) is the first and most fundamental source of law mentioned by Kautilya. It represents the eternal moral and religious codes that guide society and is derived from sacred texts and tradition. All royal decrees and judgments were ideally expected to align with this principle.

The incorrect option is 2:
Vyavhar (Testimony/Customary Practice/Transaction) serves as the practical evidence or judicial precedent derived from actual transactions and disputes. Kautilya clearly states that courts must consider the facts, evidence, and established business practices when adjudicating cases, making it a critical source of law.

The incorrect option is 3:
Charitra (Custom) refers to the local, regional, and national customs, as well as the traditions established by wise elders or previous rulers. Kautilya acknowledged the diversity of practices across the realm and included respected local custom as a valid source of law, particularly when statutory law was silent.